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Turing’s Thinking Machines: Resonances with
Surrealism & the Avant-Garde of the Early 20th Century
Klemens E. James1
Abstract. This paper examines the thinking machines depicted
in the visual and theoretical works of Surrealism and other
avant-garde movements of the early 20th century. The aim is to
establish to what extent the conceptions of these machines
prefigure Turing’s ideas about the mechanical brain. Whereas
Surrealism and its artistic antecedents (such as the Dadaists) are
generally thought to have been uninterested in or mistrustful of
such technological developments, it will shown that a number of
artists/theorists (Ernst, Duchamp, Picabia, Hausmann, Matta,
Dalí, Caillois) envisaged the notion of the thinking machine in a
manner which anticipated a number of Turing’s ideas (the
gendered machine, machine consciousness, the child-machine,
pleasure-pain systems, randomness).

inner reality of the self and materiality of the outer world.
Inspired by Bachelard’s theories, the Surrealists attempted to
harness the knowledge gleaned from these liminal states not only
for their creative projects but also to intuit and depict a vision of
the future (and the role of machines and robots within it).
The Surrealists took on Bachelard’s merging of the conscious
and unconscious mind as part of a broader project to reconcile
the antinomies of nature [4,5] (this not only fitted in with their
belief in a Hegelian-inspired dialectics but formed the basis of
their aesthetic). In their iconography and writings, experiments
in reconciling oppositional concepts resulted in depictions of
man merging with machine. The man-machine hybrid could be
seen in the works of Max Ernst, Marcel Duchamp, Francis
Picabia, Roberto Matta, Salvador Dalí and Roger Caillois – and
although Ernst and Duchamp were deeply mistrustful of machine
technology, the others viewed it in a rather more nuanced (and
even more positive) light, even going so far as to postulate the
future development of an intelligent machine.
Surrealist scholar Dawn Ades interprets Breton’s underlying
message in the First Surrealist Manifesto as ‘“we as poets have
just as much right to do research and do experiments in this field
as the scholars and scientists do”. And so, he was setting up
Surrealism [...] as a kind of arena for experiment’[6].

1 INTRODUCTION11
In his 1950 article ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’ Alan
Turing asked the question ‘can machines think?’ and predicted
that ‘at the end of the century the use of words and general
educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able
to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be
contradicted’[1]. His statements were visionary, the product of a
mind very much ahead of it time, especially given today’s
reliance on computers to conduct intellectual operations that
were previously the work of the human mind. This paper aims to
show how Turing’s vision of a thinking machine was the
preoccupation of many of his contemporaries and his immediate
antecedents, not in the scientific world but in the European
avant-garde, particularly in Dada and Surrealism. In so doing I
want to challenge two principal assumptions: that of the
irreconcilability of the sciences and arts, but also that all voices
within Surrealism and its immediate precursors were
uninterested in or opposed to the evolution of technology, and
the further modelling of machine upon man.2 Whereas it is true
that two of Surrealism’s founding fathers, André Breton and
Max Ernst, were somewhat dismissive of science, they, like all
Surrealists, were profoundly influenced by the scientific writer
Gaston Bachelard in Nouvel Esprit Scientifique [2] (1934) which
situated Surrealism and modern physics ‘in a non-classical, nonCartesian, non-Newtonian, non-Kantian epistemology’[3] and
showed how the imagination could yield new scientific
paradigms, news forms of architecture and space, new forms of
poetry and thinking; this, according to Bachelard, occurred at the
threshold between the conscious and subconscious mind, and the

2 THINKING MACHINES IN THE EUROPEAN
AVANT-GARDE OF THE EARLY 20TH
CENTURY
2.1 Artistic consciousness in the Machine Age
This paper begins by surveying the general view of thinking
machines within the cultural and artistic movements of early 20 th
century Europe2 – and how this helped pave the way for the
Surrealists’ conception of such an invention. Historically
speaking the early 20th century coincided with the end of the
Second Industrial revolution (also known as the Machine Age).
This saw the rise of mass consumption and the production line,
Herman Hollerith’s tabulation machines [7] (first distributed by
IBM in 1924), telephone and radio technology, industrial,
printing and military equipment, as well as improved
transportation (in the form of trains, automobiles and aircraft).
Whether at work, in leisure or in warfare, this was an age which
2
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In so doing, the paper develops the invaluable work already done in this
field by Gavin Parkinson in Surrealism, art, and modern science:
relativity, quantum mechanics, epistemology (2008) who has shown how
Surrealists frequently drew on scientific theory to inform both theory and
practice.
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was to bring man and the machine inexorably closer together; an
age which was also to forge the artistic and scientific conscience
of the Western avant-garde and a generation of scientists to
which Turing belonged (scientists who drew on the knowledge
of this industrial age only to become pioneers of the information
age).
According to Foster in Prosthetic Gods, the anticipation of a
closer alliance of man and machine was common to avant-garde
movements in many western countries, occurring: ‘in Futurism
in Italy, Vorticism in England, Purism in France, Precisionism in
the United States, Neue Sachlichkeit in Germany, and
Constructivism in Russia and elsewhere’[8]. Apart from
Surrealism’s prefiguration of a number of Turing’s ideas, these
movements did not generally demonstrate the viability of
machine intelligence per se, but rather confirmed the fascination
we have with human-like qualities of machine performance (as
well as the machine-like, automatic qualities of humans). They
also highlighted the encroachment of machines upon the domain
of human industry, and the varying emotional reactions that
thinking machines and mechanical men elicited. Individual
members of the latter avant-garde movements reacted to these
notions with a mixture of awe and jubilation, on the one hand,
and extreme trepidation, on the other.

or passions, succumb to flights of inspiration or become fallible
like humans. Turing riposted that this would presume we could
only truly know of someone else’s feelings (machine or person),
if we became them; and that such an argument amounted to
nothing more than a defence of solipsism. This would mean that
the only knowledge of which we could be certain would be
derived from our own selves, our internal processes, our own
thoughts and emotions. In making this a criticism, Turing tacitly
entertained the possibility of a conscious machine, whilst
conceding that there is some mystery about consciousness[1].

2.3 Machines out of control: World War One and
Metropolis
Let us return to the attitude of the avant-garde towards the notion
of the intelligent machine. Following the realities of World War
One, and the devastating impact of military armaments upon
human life, a number of cultural and artistic movements became
ambivalent or critical about the prospect of further technological
development and the creation of a thinking machine. Vorticists
and Expressionists who previously extolled technology now
became sceptical about it. Dadaists and Surrealists were
publically dismissive of technology, though willing nonetheless
to employ those new media, which had resulted from the Second
Industrial revolution (such as film and photography as well as
typing and printing machines). And, as we have already
established, neither Dadaists nor Surrealists could escape the
conceptualisation of man as machine (and vice-versa) in their
works.
Significant reappraisals of technology’s value occurred within
the avant-garde of Germany, including those that helped to
define Surrealism’s view of a machine-driven future. In 1927,
the film Metropolis [12], an Expressionist film vividly portrayed
the bringing to life of a robotic woman who is cloned from the
city’s proletariat leader and visionary, Maria. Maria is so
convincing in her femininity that she is first employed as a
dancing performer for the men of the upper classes, fuelling their
lust for her and aggression toward each other as they vie for her
attention. She is subsequently sent by the city’s evil capitalist
leader to incite rebellion amongst the working classes, so that he
has a pretext to crush their dissent and reinforce his power over
the city. Somewhat ironically, she also urges the proletariat to
destroy all the industrial machines, which they work on by day.
Mankind’s integration with the machine is presented as dystopic,
though this is hardly surprising given the devastation wreaked
upon the world by the killing machines of World War One.
The film can also be interpreted in the light of Turing’s ideas,
particularly his test for machines in order to establish whether
they can be considered in any way intelligent. The so-called
Turing Test requires the machine to fool a human interrogator
into believing it is of one particular sex or another. The
interrogator also questions another participant who is an actual
human of the opposite sex to the one which the machine is
assuming, though both the human and machine are concealed
behind a screen so that the interrogator has no knowledge of who
is who.
In Metropolis, a similar process takes place whereby the
human heroine, Maria, is captured and thus taken out of the
narrative only to be replaced by a robotic Doppelgänger. The
responses the imposter elicits, both erotic and verbal, are
sufficient to indicate that her audience (who have a similar

2.2 Futurism, Vorticism and the cult of the
machine
One of the most confident predictions that machines would one
day be able to think came from the Futurists whose spokesman
Filippo Marinetti considered the oft-made assertion made by car
owners and factory directors that vehicles appear to have ‘a
personality, a soul, will’ to be indicative of a ‘sensibility of the
machine’[9]. In another Futurist manifesto of 1914, his
colleagues Bruno Corra and Emilio Settimelli wrote ‘there is no
essential difference between a human brain and a machine. It is
mechanically more complicated, that is all. For example, a typewriter is a primitive organism governed by a logic that is
imposed in it by its construction’[9]. In addition to machines
simulating organic life, humans were also encouraged by the
Futurists to become more machine-like, denuding themselves of
love, sentiment, filial attachments and irrationality. The Futurists
also glorified the machine gun and war.
The Vorticists, who were based in Great Britain, denounced
the Futurist’s fetishisation of technology and their ‘lyrical shouts
about the God-Automobile’[10], which to them represented a
cult that was no more credible than Voodooism. In a manner
evoking the Futurists, however, they proclaimed that ‘a machine
is in a greater or less degree, a living thing’[10] while critiquing
their depictions of machines in ‘violent movement’, which to
them resulted in nothing more than a blur or a kaleidoscope; ‘the
very spirit of the machine is lost’[11] bewailed the movement’s
co-founder Wyndham Lewis.
In their assertions Filippo Marinetti and Wyndham Lewis
were not unlike those of Turing, who also believed that machines
had the potential to perform many of the cerebral operations of
the human brain which were fundamental to intelligence. In his
article ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’[1], he also left
open the possibility of machines developing conscience. He did
this by arguing against his contemporary, the neurosurgeon
Geoffrey Jefferson, who had insisted that computers would not
become in any sense living until they were able to feel emotions
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question of just how persuasive a machine must be as a man or
woman in order to be considered intelligent. In fact, Turing
believed that thinking machines could convince the interrogator
of their gender irrespective of external appearances: ‘No
engineer or chemist claims to be able to produce a material
which is indistinguishable from the human skin. It is possible
that at some time this might be done, but even supposing this
invention available we should feel there was little point in trying
to make a 'thinking machine' more human by dressing it up in
such artificial flesh’[1]. We thus have a further area of
correspondence between the avant-garde and Turing whereby
machines are portrayed as imitating human behaviour and
intelligence in terms of their status as gendered beings without
necessarily sharing all their physical attributes.
Marcel Duchamp and Francis Picabia, who were associated
with both Dada and Surrealism also produced works depicting
gendered machines. Duchamp’s painting Nude Descending a
Staircase depicts a female walking down a staircase in a manner
that evokes stroboscopic motion photography (a photograph
created by a succession of superimposed images). By his own
admission he was influenced by the stop-motion photography of
Étienne-Jules Marey, exemplified by the photo Man Walking
[14,15]. Nude Descending a Staircase mediates a sense of
kineticism, which seems redolent of Futurism, though Duchamp
was by no means the technophile that Marinetti was (despite
being knowledgeable about science). According to Linda
Henderson the work ‘stands as his first fully realized response to
Cubism's pursuit of the invisible realities suggested by the
discovery of X-rays in 1895. At the same time, Duchamp
deliberately distinguished that work from the Cubist style by
incorporating both a figure in motion (virtually never seen in
Cubism) and the humorous implications of X-ray stripping (here
both the clothing and flesh of the nude disappear)’[16]. Rather
strikingly, the stripping down of the human subject to its skeletal
form (whose kinetic energies are visibly highlighted) gives it a
highly robotic appearance.
Duchamp’s
influences
(x-rays,
invisible
realities,
stroboscopic photography) are interesting in so far as they reflect
the impact of the Machine Age upon human consciousness. His
work expresses an ambiguity by which we are uncertain as to
whether the female subject is a human depicted under its
mechanical guise or a robot depicted under a human guise (an
ambiguity which we will witness time and again in the works of
the avant-gardists). While being dismissive of science and art’s
more grandiose claims, Duchamp aimed in his own words at
achieving in his works a ‘juxtaposition of mechanical elements
and visceral forms’[17]. Up to the time he had produced the
painting he had moreover been involved in another avant-garde
movement known as the Section d’Or or the Puteaux group, an
offshoot of Cubism, which sought to express geometrical
perfection in its paintings and endorsed the achievements of
science and technology

function to the interrogator) have been totally duped into
believing she is a woman. As Julia Dover states in her article on
Turing and Metropolis ‘the film plays disturbingly with the site
of consciousness and authority in the relationship of human and
machine (like the Turing test)’[13] – referring to robotic Maria’s
capacity to embody consciousness and to wield power, in a
manner which makes her pass as human to all who encounter
her.

3 CRITIQUE OF THE THINKING MACHINE:
MAX ERNST AND MARCEL DUCHAMP
One erstwhile Expressionist who became a leading figure in both
Dada and Surrealism was Max Ernst. In the immediate aftermath
of the First World War, Ernst produced a series of 50 works
based on machines and scientific instruments as a part of his
early Dada phase. Dada was in rupture with those movements
such as Futurism, which had sought to glorify the machine and
foster its integration into human life. For this reason, a number
of Ernst’s diagrammatic works depicted machinery with human
traits in a way that satirised or critiqued the notion of the living
machine. As Foster affirms: ‘this parodic presentation of the
military-industrial subject is not only a riposte to fascist visions
of war and masculinity. More generally, in keeping with German
Dada at large ... , it is an insult to the humanist ideals of art and
individuality cherished by the classes that forced the war in the
first place’[8]. There was no doubt that Ernst perceived the
realities of a fusion between intelligent man and machine, having
been witness to the imperious role played by technology in the
war and the increasing industrialisation of Europe. It was,
however, the machine’s capacity to dehumanise man (rather than
its ability to become itself a thinking, sentient being) that Ernst
found unsettling.
Two of Ernst’s works reveal anthropomorphic machines,
which are indicative of his attitude. The first, The Hat Makes the
Man, reveals a human subject usurped on the one hand by
phallic-shaped mechanical structures, all which are capped by
the fetishised commodities of mass industrial production (in this
case the hats, which also suggest a form of phallic
embellishment). The second entitled Fiat modes, pereat ars
represents the inversion of Latin saying fiat ars, pereat vita (‘let
there be art, life is fleeting’). The revised title translates as ‘let
there be fashion, art is fleeting’, again, signifying the modern
subject in the grip of commodity fetishism and conditioned
principally by industrial and mechanical processes. The male
tailor depicted in the drawing partakes in these processes by
measuring up and working upon the model (both tailor and
model appear as automata). Whereas Turing speaks about
machines in terms of their future evolution as intelligent,
reasoning entities, Ernst highlights the flipside of the equation –
that as machines evolve, and become ever more intelligent,
humans are stupefied, especially as their reliance on the latter
grows.
As noted earlier, Ernst had allowed the mechanical structures
of The Hat Makes the Man to appear phallic in nature; indeed
many of his diagrammatic works had presented monolithic
machines as precariously erected phallic edifices. Many of the
gendered machines depicted in Surrealist and avant-garde
artworks didn’t resemble men or women in a physical sense
(their gender being expressed by means of symbolism or
metonymically). This brings us back to the Turing Test and the

4 THE LEARNING MACHINES OF FRANCIS
PICABIA AND RAOUL HAUSMANN
Strongly influenced by Duchamp, Francis Picabia produced
many paintings in the years 1915-1922 whose imagery has been
termed mechanomorphic, in other words, striving to imitate the
forms of machines. This stylistic turn was first inspired by a visit
to New York, upon which he remarked: ‘I have been profoundly
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major preoccupations, as reflected in two of his works, which
bore exactly this title Daughter born without a mother. The first,
which is a drawing, represents an early attempt at developing his
mechanomorphic style; the second, a painting, shows the style at
a more developed stage of its evolution. Unlike in Duchamp’s
oeuvre, Picabia’s subjects are not gendered in these and most of
his other works. However, the notion of his machine as a child,
which is still ‘at a dependent stage’ is certainly germane to
Turing’s thought.
Turing speculates that in order for a machine to become
intelligent, it is preferable to train and educate it like a child. The
process by which a machine is taught to think ‘should bear a
close relation of that of teaching.’[20] Starting from a tabula rasa
the machine would thus learn behaviours and aptitudes that
would lead to it becoming intelligent:

impressed by the vast mechanical development in America. The
machine has become more than a mere adjunct of life. It is really
a part of human life ... perhaps the very soul’[18]. Like
Duchamp, Picabia emphasises the interconnectedness of man
and machine, though unlike the latter (and very nihilistic spirit of
Dada in general), he was willing to entertain the machine’s more
positive (functional and aesthetic) qualities. Moreover, to claim
the machine constitutes the soul of human life does suggest a
certain kinship with Turing’s thinking. Picabia implies that the
machine is not only man’s central preoccupation, but that man’s
original preoccupations with himself and his own endeavours
has been supplanted by the machine’s capacities to perform so
many of the tasks of everyday life (including, invariably, those
which require intelligence).
A friend and associate of Picabia’s, Paul Haviland, was a
critical influence on the artist’s life, especially in terms of how
he theorised upon humanity’s relationship to machines. Haviland
and Picabia had collaborated on the same New York-based
avant-garde journal 291, and Picabia had painted his friend in the
form of an electrical lamp as if to pay testament to his ingenuity
and interest in mechanical media such as photography.
Commenting on the importance of the machine, Haviland had
stated that:

Instead of trying to produce a programme to simulate
the adult mind, why not rather try to produce one
which simulates the child's? If this were then
subjected to an appropriate course of education one
would obtain the adult brain. Presumably the childbrain is something like a note-book as one buys it
from the stationers. Rather little mechanism, and lots
of blank sheets.[1]

We are living in the age of the machine. Man made the
machine in his own image. She has limbs which act;
lungs which breathe; a heart which beats; a nervous
system through which runs electricity. The
phonograph is the image of his voice; the camera the
image of his eye.[19]

Turing refers to the machines who follow such a program as
‘child-machines’, a term which evokes Picabia’s idea of a
‘daughter born without a mother’ who is still in need of the
guidance of her creator.
Turing’s quasi-constructivist ideas about the development of
the child-machine can be related to a Dadaist work: Raoul
Hausmann’s The Mechanical Head, which had the subtitle of
The Spirit of Our Age. Hausmann, who was the leader of Berlin
Dada, sought to challenge the notion that intelligence was innate
and that the genius of artists and poets was an inexplicable godgiven attribute.
Various objects have been attached to the surface of his
assemblage, which resembles a robotic head, suggesting that
humans (and, potentially machines, as there is an ambiguity
here) are conditioned and educated principally by external
influences. Significantly, many of the objects on the side of the
head are employed for mechanical or scientific operations:
measuring devices, ruler, pocket watch mechanism, typewriter
and camera segments. Hausmann thus seeks to question both the
nature of man’s inner self in the Machine Age and the processes
by which he evolves into a thinking, reasoning individual:

There is a striking similarity between Haviland’s words and
another of Turing’s texts in which he lays out a methodology for
creating a thinking machine, involving the replacement of each
part of the human body with machinery that performs the
equivalent function:
A great positive reason for believing in the possibility
of making thinking machinery is the fact that it is
possible to make machinery to imitate any small part
of a man. That the microphone does this for the ear,
and the television camera for the eye, are
commonplaces. One can also produce remote
controlled Robots whose limbs balance the body with
the aid of servo-mechanisms. [...] The electrical
circuits which are used in electronic computing
machinery seem to have the essential properties of
nerves.[20]

What is the purpose of spirit in a world that proceeds
mechanically? What is man? He can be both a happy
and a sorry affair, and he is formed and spoken
through his mode of production, his social
environment. You see.... you believe you think and
make decisions, you believe yourself to be original –
and what happens? The social environment [...] has
thrown the soul-machine into gear and the whole thing
runs itself.[21]

A further similarity between Haviland and Turing, as well as
Haviland and Picabia is the engineering of a machine in the
image of a human child, which is subsequently brought up and
educated by its human creator, as noted by Haviland:
The machine is his “daughter born without a mother”.
That is why he loves her. [...] But the machine is yet at
a dependent stage [....] She submits to his will but he
must direct her activities....[19]

The notion that intelligence evolves both as an upward
expanding spiral from childhood and in relation to one’s
surroundings has resonances with important theories of
education and cognitive psychology which were being

Haviland’s comments about the machine being man’s
‘daughter born without a mother’ encapsulated one of Picabia’s
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‘pleasure’ o-r ‘reward’ (R) and the other for ‘pain’ or
‘punishment’ (P).[20]

developed at the time. The Swiss developmental psychologist
Jean Piaget propounded the idea that children behaved almost
like little scientists, making and testing hypotheses fairly
independently in order to construct an understanding of the
world [22]. In the process they would adapt their mental
structures to meet the demands of the environment and
progressively become intelligent, reasoning adults. Piaget’s
theories point to a remarkable confluence of ideas within art,
science and developmental psychology, which take the tabula
rasa of the child (and its subsequent epistemological evolution)
as the basis for acquiring intelligence.

In Wound Interrogation, we see a robot appearing to analyse
a sizeable wound of the human flesh, which is nonetheless
integrated into a network of robots surrounding it. The fact that
the wound is being subjected to such scrutiny suggests that it is
able to yield information and that the robot has something to
gain from interrogating it. The process reminds one somewhat of
Turing’s comments on the value of pain in helping the machine
to evolve:
Pleasure interference has a tendency to fix the
character i.e. towards preventing it changing, whereas
pain stimuli tend to disrupt the character, causing
features which had become fixed to change, or to
become again subject to random variation.[20]

5 MATTA, DALÍ AND THE INSPIRATION OF
SCIENCE
5.1 Matta, pain and consciousness

We are, however, confronted here with an ambiguity similar
to that in the works of Duchamp and Hausmann, as we cannot be
certain whether these figures are humans with mechanical
properties, or machines with humanoid traits. If the former, then
our future appears dystopian, with humans becoming slaves to
industrial processes and barely distinguishable from the
production line upon which they operate; if, on the other hand,
they are thinking robots, then we can again see a prefiguration of
the type of intelligent (and gendered) machine postulated by
Turing, which is guided like a child and responds to stimuli of
pleasure and pain.

The painting of Roberto Matta, a Chilean Surrealist artist,
extended the notion of the thinking machine by combining the
concepts of psychoanalysis and science in his paintings. He
affirmed that ‘a new school of painters could evolve from
contemporary physics, as an earlier school (Surrealism) had
evolved from modern psychology’[23]. Having studied
architecture, he attempted to depict the architecture of the soul in
terms of non-Euclidean geometry in paintings known as
‘inscapes’. The word inscape is a portmanteau term denoting the
interiority of the self as expressed through landscapes of external
morphology. Matta also depicted outer reality as a reflection of
the latest scientific discoveries (such as relativity, sub-atomic
quanta and the latest inventions of the Machine Age).
Many of his paintings showed the implications of these
discoveries for the future, including the proliferation of
biomechanical mutations. The future as he saw it could be both
vital and menacing. In the painting Octrui, we witness a
menacing scene: industrial robots working on a production line
blur the boundaries between man and machine, displaying clear
organic characteristics. As with the machine of the Turing test
these robots are gendered, albeit that their sexual attributes
similarly straddle the organic and the mechanical (their genitalia
resembling mechanical spiders!). According to the Surrealists’
spokesman, André Breton, these were robots ‘carrying harrows
on their backs and wearing crossbows round their necks..... but
who nevertheless maintain a frenzied lingual and genital
commerce’[24]. The harrows, crossbows and other sharp
implements mediate an atmosphere that is violent, clinical and
disturbing. In Octrui and Wound Interrogation (which typify
Matta’s iconography in the 1940s and 1950s), we even have the
impression that robots are being controlled by pleasure-pain
systems. Turing discusses such systems in relation to machine
learning. If the machine is to be made to think in the manner of a
child, then:

5.2 Dalí, quantum mechanics and randomness
For the painter Salvador Dalí physics was ‘the new geometry of
thought’[25] and he too saw the artist as an interpreter of the
scientific phenomena of his time. Like Matta, he had been
inspired by Freudian psychoanalysis in order to depict the inner
life and by scientific theory in order to represent external reality.
He was influenced above all by Einstein’s theory of
relativity[26] and Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle.
Heisenberg had made foundational contributions to quantum
mechanics, asserting that it was impossible to record
simultaneously the position and momentum of a particle without
the measuring equipment of one impacting upon the nature of
the other. In other words, the observer had a direct impact on the
phenomena he was measuring. Dalí used this idea to draw
parallels between science and human conscience and create a
new artistic style known as nuclear mysticism. He sought to
show how the observer of the physical world could, from his
own subjective viewpoint, also help to shape its reality (this idea
extended his famed paranoiac critical method): ‘From a quantum
mechanics standpoint, Dalí’s double [i.e. illusionistic] images
perfectly reflect Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle: what one
sees depends on the observer. In the same way as he had done
with Freud, Dalí assimilated a new scientific theory and
reworked it visually’[6]. It must be stressed here that Dalí’s
eccentric mix of science and art takes us quite far from the
quantum mechanics of the laboratory, becoming rather a science
of subjectivity (which, as will shortly be demonstrated, is
nonetheless germane to Turing’s thought).
Dalí’s interest in quantum mechanics was further reflected in
his works by depicting his subjects as agglomerations of sub-

The organisation of a machine into a universal
machine would be most impressive if the
arrangements of interference involve very few inputs.
The training of the human child depends largely on a
system of rewards and punishments, and this suggests
that it ought to be possible to carry through the
organising with only two interfering inputs, one for
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atomic particles. As we will now see, these particles, which were
shaped like rhinoceros horns (i.e. perfect logarithmic spirals),
were shown to be common to material objects as well as human
consciousness.
The painting Raphaelesque Head Exploding represents a head
composed of a plethora of spiral-shaped particles. This image
challenges our view of the integrity of matter and the appearance
of coherent phenomena which are, in fact, totally fragmented.
Whereas the painting represents a head in its externality, The
Disintegration of the Persistence of Memory, portrays the
interiority of the head, and specifically man’s consciousness of
the passing of time in its subjective, non-linear aspect.
Significantly, this inner world is also shown as being composed
of the same sub-atomic particles.
What interests us in Dalí’s theories, especially in how they
relate to Turing’s, is this connection between thought and
quantum mechanics. Turing believed that one component within
a thinking machine had to be capable of random behaviour in
order for it to imitate human thinking convincingly: Turing ‘had
a deep-seated conviction that the real brain has a ‘‘roulette
wheel’’ somewhere in it’ [20]. Although Turing affirms that a
thinking machine should, to a substantial degree function
according to predictable processes, being of a type that
resembles a calculator (rather than a bulldozer), he concedes that
this is not always possible:

6 DALÍ, CAILLOIS AND THE PROPHECY OF
THE MECHANICAL BRAIN

It was also necessary that this machine should be of
the sort whose behaviour is in principle predictable by
calculation. We certainly do not know how any such
calculation should be done, and it was even argued by
Sir Arthur Eddington that on account of the
indeterminacy principle in quantum mechanics no
such prediction is even theoretically possible. [27]

Although Dalí made these comments in 1969, they were still
prophetic in nature given that machines were still a long way
from their modern-day incarnations. Throughout the post-war
period, Dalí maintained an interest in the very latest scientific
developments commenting that ‘literati can’t give me anything.
Scientists give me everything’[6]. He was therefore well
positioned to gauge the scientific developments of the present
and the near future. His comments also seem to mirror those of
Turing in dispelling the scare-mongering about mechanical
brains. Turing describes the argument that ‘thinking machines
are simply too awful to contemplate and can therefore never
become a reality’ as the ‘head in the sand’ objection, dismissing
it as insufficiently ‘substantial to require refutation’[1].
In the same decade, the sociologist and philosopher Roger
Caillois, who had written widely on science in the Surrealist
journal Minotaure, also posited the existence of a thinking
computer. He considered its success in terms of its ability to
compete in an ‘absolute’ chess game:

In addition to exploring the quantum nature of the human mind,
Dalí shared Turing’s conviction about the possibility of thinking
machines. In an interview with Alain Bosquet he stated:
People usually think of cybernetics as something
abominable, they imagine that the world is being
guided more and more by mechanical brains. They’re
afraid that the intervention of human genius is
decreasing. But in point of fact, the opposite is true.
Cybernetic machines are getting rid of the things that
encumber us; until now, first-rate brains were
stockpiling a mass of useless information. It’s
comforting to know that from now on the machines
will be supplying the dimensions of the noses in all
paintings and sculptures; all we’ll have to do is press a
button or develop a couple of microfilms. In other
times, the same task would have taken experts and
scientists decades to finish. The IBM machine will
clean away all the drudgery and red tape of secondclass human knowledge. Furthermore, the computers
are already starting to act like human beings and with
their own psychology.[25]

Interestingly it is on the basis of quantum mechanics that he
casts doubt over the possibility of a machine operating entirely
by deterministic principles. As scientists have discovered in
quantum mechanical experiments, the behaviour of wave
functions, when measured, appears to be quite random. Turing’s
reference to Sir Arthur Eddington and quantum theory to
establish the limits of predictability in machine behaviour
suggests that machines need to display signs of randomness if
they are ever to simulate human intelligence. Randomness is a
concept which Turing returns to time after time in his writings,
and, in so doing, he underlines the wisdom of including a
random element in a learning machine[20]. If, for example, a
digital computer can perform the equivalent operation of
throwing a die, it might produce numbers which can be kept in a
store for future functions or can be helped to generate random
approaches at solving a particular problem[20] (in other words,
engage in trial-and-error style interrogations). Moreover, if a
program allows for random behaviours it may even allow a
computer to exhibit a certain amount of ‘free will’, though this is
not a term, which Turing necessarily favoured [20].
Dalí effectively extends Turing’s ideas by suggesting that the
‘quantum’ randomness of human thought not only determines
behaviour but, much more radically, the nature of reality as
perceived by the consciousness.

It is not probable, but it is possible and perhaps
theoretically necessary that there should be such a
thing as an absolute chess game, i.e. one in which
from the first move to the last no stratagem should
work, since the best possible move is automatically
neutralised. It is not too farfetched to suppose that an
electronic computer having exhausted all conceivable
combinations, could construct this ideal game.
However, one would no longer be playing chess. The
first move alone would determine the winner or
perhaps the loser of the game. [28]
Significantly Caillois wrote this comment in a treatise on
game-playing entitled Man, play, and games in which mimicry
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was foregrounded as one of four major characteristics of play3 –
a concept which was also seen by Turing to be fundamental for
machines to succeed at the Turing test. Caillois seems to be even
more positive than Turing about the prospect of a computer
successfully playing chess. Indeed, his comments seem
vindicated in as much as the reigning world chess champion,
Gary Kasparov, was beaten by IBM’s Deep Blue in May 1997.
On the other hand, Turing believed a computer could evolve to
play ‘very good chess’ despite making errors, and only after it
had been programmed to display intelligence:

conceived as children who were made in the eyes of their human
creators and needed the latter’s guidance for their future
development; this notion was also advanced by Turing who
believed that humans could help to train robots to become
thinking, reasoning entities. For Matta and Dalí, the same
energies and structures underpinned both human consciousness
and technological processes. For Dalí the effect of the
consciousness apprehending the world was analogous to the role
of the observer of wave-particles in quantum mechanics,
reflecting how randomness and subjectivity were an integral part
of human thought. Turing similarly realised the importance of
the capacity for randomness within intelligent machinery,
especially in its simulation of human behaviour. Both Dalí and
Caillois believed in the future evolution of thinking computers,
which would replicate human thought processes in the context of
game play. In their capacity to merge antinomies (such as
human and machine) and establish conceptual connections
between disparate disciplines, the Surrealists anticipated many
significant aspects of Turing’s thinking machine.

Can the machine play chess?’ It could fairly easily be
made to play a rather bad game. It would be bad
because chess requires intelligence. We stated at the
beginning of this section that the machine should be
treated as entirely without intelligence. There are
indications however that it is possible to make the
machine display intelligence at the risk of its making
occasional serious mistakes. By following up this
aspect the machine could probably be made to play
very good chess. [29]
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